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European Central Bank working paper series 26Abstract
This paper compares securities settlement gross and netting architec-
tures. It studies settlement risk arising from exogenous operational
delays and compares settlement failures between the two architectures
as functions of the length of the settlement interval under diﬀerent mar-
ket conditions. While settlement failures are non-monotonically related
to the length of settlement cycles under both architectures, there is no
clear cut ranking of which architecture delivers greater stability. We
show that while, on average, netting systems seem to be more stable
than gross systems, rare events may lead to contagious defaults that
could aﬀect the all system. Furthermore netting system are very sensi-
tive to the number and initial distribution of traded shares.
JEL classiﬁcation: C6, D4, G20, O33.
Keywords: Security clearing and settlement, gross and net systems, systemic risk.
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November 2004Securities settlement systems (SSS) are institutional arrangements for conﬁrmation,
clearance and settlement of securities trades and safekeeping of securities. Diﬀerent
arrangements for settlement have been devised. In gross settlements systems pay-
ments are executed continuously or in batches via transfers of central bank funds
from the account of the paying bank to the account of the receiving bank. By con-
trast in netting arrangements each party only delivers its net sale, or receives its net
purchase, resulting in very signiﬁcant reductions in gross exposure. Nonetheless, in
net settlement systems a failure to settle results in an unwind, i.e., the deletion of
some or all of the provisional transfers involving the defaulting participant and the
recalculation of the settlement obligations of the non-defaulting participants. An un-
wind would have the eﬀect of imposing liquidity pressures and replacement costs on
the non-defaulting participants that had delivered securities to, or received securities
from, the defaulting participant, thus generating contagion and systemic failure.
Currently there is a given lag between the date of trade and the date of settle-
ment. The longer this lag the greater the risk that one of the parties may default on
the trade, and the greater the possibility for security prices to move away from the
contract prices, thereby increasing replacement costs risk. Both these risks can be
reduced by compressing the time between trade execution and settlement.
In this paper we study the eﬀects of increasing the number of intraday settlement
batches, when exogenous random delays aﬀect the transfer of securities. For a given
distribution of lengths of delays, the likelihood that delays will lead to settlement
failure increases as the length of settlement cycles decreases. Thus, we study the
interplay between stabilization resulting from reduction in the number of parties
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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARYinvolved in a shorter settlement cycle, and destabilization resulting from the eﬀects
of delays.
We assume that exogenous sources (human mistakes or operational problems) may
delay the conﬁrmation of trade and hence the settlement. We assume that no se-
curities lending market is in place and analyse the systemic eﬀects arising from the
failure to settle of one or more participants in the SSS.
We simulate settlement, over a trading day in a system with a large number of
participants. We assume that shares (of the same security) are traded in the system
and each one is exchanged several times among the participants during a trading cycle.
We monitor the buyer and seller (if trade happen) of each share at all time steps. We
also monitor if an operational delay occurs during any of the transactions. If a trade
esperience a delay longer than the remaining time till settlement it will eventually
fail to settle. In the case of gross settlement each share is settled independently
from the others. If a participant cannot settle the trade for a given share, all the
participants that agreed to exchange that share afterwards will also not be able to
settle their trades. In the case of netting, the trades of all shares of the same stock
are settled together by netting the participant positions. The failure of one or more
participants to deliver their net position of shares results in an unwind. Because of
the cancellation of some trades when recalculating the net position of the remaining
participant is possible that new traders will ﬁnd themselves unable to settle. This
may trigger more failures and unwinding.
We study the eﬀects of the length of settlement cycles on settlement failure under
diﬀerent market conditions involving factors such as liquidity, trading volume, the
frequency and length of delays and heterogeneity in the initial distribution of shares.
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under both gross and net architectures and that there is no clear-cut ranking of
which architecture performs better. While netting systems seem to be more stable
on average (at least in homogeneous conditions), rare events may lead to contagious
defaults that aﬀect the all system. Furthermore netting system are very sensitive to
the number and initial distribution of traded shares.
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Securities settlement systems (SSSs) are institutional arrangements for conﬁrmation,
clearance and settlement of securities trades and safekeeping of securities. The ﬁrst
step in the clearing and settlement process is to ensure that the buyer and the seller
agree on the terms of the trade. Following a trade, each party sends an advisory
message identifying the counterpart, the security, the quantity of the security, the
invoice price, and the settlement date. This process is called trade conﬁrmation.
After trades have been conﬁrmed, the next step in the process is clearance, the
computation of the obligations of the counterparts to make deliveries or to make
payments on the settlement date. Finally settlement are the operations by which
securities are transferred from seller to buyer and payments from buyer to seller.
Participants in SSSs face a variety of risks (see Committee on Payment and Settle-
ment Systems (2001)). There is the risk that participants will not settle (credit risk)
or that there will be a delay in settlement (liquidity risk). These include the risk
that securities are delivered but payment not received and vice-versa (principal risk).
Other risks arise from mistakes and deﬁciencies in information and controls (opera-
tional risk), from the safekeeping of securities by third parties (custody risk), or from
failures of the legal system that supports the rules and procedures of the settlement
system (legal risk). If the failure of one participant renders other participants un-
able to meet their obligations, the settlement system might be a source of instability
for ﬁnancial markets more generally (systemic risk) (see De Bandt and Hartmann
(2002) for a review on systemic risk). The complexity of settlement operations and
the varieties of parties involved make SSSs a critical component of the infrastructure
of global ﬁnancial markets. A ﬁnancial or operational problem during the settlement
process has the potential to propagate the crisis to other payment systems used by
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the SSS or that use the SSS to transfer collaterals.In some markets, a central counterparts (CCP) interposes itself, becoming the buyer
to the seller and the seller to the buyer. The use of a CCP reduces credit risk and liq-
uidity risk. Most markets have also established central securities depositories (CSDs)
that immobilise physical securities and transfer ownership by means of book entries
to electronic accounting systems. Not all buyers and sellers of securities hold accounts
at the CSD; instead, they may hold their securities and settle their trades through a
custodian (see Holthausen and Tapking (2003) for an analysis of competition between
CDS and custodians). The cash leg of the transactions is typically settled through
the central bank payment system. The advantage of using central bank funds for pay-
ments is that it eliminates credit risks to the selling agent (see Freixas et al (2002)
for a comparative analysis of the risks arising from settlement in central bank money
or private money).
Delivery versus payment (DVP) is the practice of linking securities transfers to funds
transfers to ensures that principal risk is eliminated. The settlement of securities
transactions on a DVP basis reduces, but does not eliminate, the risk that the failure
of an SSS participant could result in systemic disruptions. A failure to deliver by
one party leaves the counterpart needing to replace the transaction at the current
market price. The magnitude of replacement cost risk depends on the volatility
of the security price and the amount of time that elapses between the trade and
the settlement dates. Diﬀerent methods for achieving DVP can be distinguished
according to whether the securities and/or funds transfers are settled on a gross
(trade by trade) basis or on a net basis. Further distinctions relate to whether the
transactions are settled in real time, (i.e. throughout the day), in intraday batches, or
at the end of the day. Real time gross settlements systems (RTGS), where payments
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the paying bank to the account of the receiving bank, while reducing systemic risk,
increase liquidity risk. Participants need to hold for a given volume of transactions,
on average more reserves and gridlocks may also occur if the ﬂow of payments is
disrupted because participants are waiting to receive payments before sending them1.
By contrast in netting arrangements each party only delivers its net sale, or receives its
net purchase, resulting in very signiﬁcant reductions in gross exposure. Nonetheless,
in net settlement systems a failure to settle results in an unwind, i.e., the deletion
of some or all of the provisional transfers involving the defaulting participant and
the recalculation of the settlement obligations of the non-defaulting participants. An
unwind would have the eﬀect of imposing liquidity pressures and replacement costs on
the non-defaulting participants that had delivered securities to, or received securities
from, the defaulting participant. Should one or more of the initially non-defaulting
participants be unable to cover the shortfalls and default in turn, the system would
almost surely fail to settle and it is likely that both the securities markets and the
payment system would be disrupted.
Currently there is a given lag between the date of trade and the date of settle-
ment. The longer this lag the greater the risk that one of the parties may default
on the trade, and the greater the possibility for security prices to move away from
the contract prices, thereby increasing replacement costs risk. Both these risks can
1Angelini (1998) studied RTGS systems under payment ﬂow uncertainty and showed in his
paper, that uncertainty together with a costly daylight liquidity, may induce participants to
postpone payment activities aﬀecting the quality of information available to the counterpart
for cash management purpose. This in turn may induce higher than optimal levels of
participants end-of-day reserve holding, relative to the social optimum.
10
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 404
November 2004be reduced by compressing the time between trade execution and settlement. In
1989, the G30 recommended that ﬁnal settlement of cash transactions should oc-
cur on T+3, i.e., three business days after trade date. The G30 recognised that to
minimise counterpart risk and market exposure same day settlement is the ﬁnal goal
(see also Leinonen (2003)). The International Organization of Securities Commis-
sions (IOSCO) created, in December 1999, the Task Force on Securities Settlement
Systems. Amongst other recommendations the Task Force has also recommended
that T+3 settlement be retained as a minimum standard. However, T+3 is no longer
regarded as best practice. The standard judged appropriate for a market depends on
factors such as transaction volume, price volatility and the ﬁnancial strength of par-
ticipants. The Task Force recommends that each market assesses whether a shorter
cycle than T+3 is appropriate.
In moving from T+n to T+0 liquidity risk becomes particularly important on the
payments side because the incoming and outcoming ﬂows of payments are not known
in advance by the cash managers. This is true whether settlement is done on a gross
basis immediately after the trade or by netting the end of day positions. By con-
trast, on the securities side liquidity is not a problem because the custodians already
have the securities at the execution date. Nonetheless, in some markets the rate of
settlement falls signiﬁcantly short of 100%, because of human errors or operational
problems. Errors or delays in transaction processing may result from incomplete or
inaccurate transmission of information or documentation, or from system deﬁciencies
or interruptions. A move to a shorter cycle could generate increased settlement fail-
ures and generate systemic risk. In fact, while shortening the settlement interval has
the advantage of reducing replacement costs following the failure of a participant to
settle, it also increases the likelihood of settlement failures.
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batches, when exogenous random delays aﬀect the transfer of securities. For a given
distribution of lengths of delays, the likelihood that delays will lead to settlement
failure increases as the length of settlement cycles decreases. Thus, we study the
interplay between stabilization resulting from reduction in the number of parties
involved in a shorter settlement cycle, and destabilization resulting from the eﬀects
of delays.
II. THE MODEL
We assume that exogenous sources (human mistakes or operational problems) may
delay the conﬁrmation of trade and hence the settlement. The inability of a party A
to deliver the security to a party B may generate in turn the failure of B to settle, if
B has already sold the security to a third party C before the settlement batch.
Mature and liquid securities lending markets (including markets for repurchase agree-
ments and other economically equivalent transactions) could improve the functioning
of securities markets, by allowing sellers ready access to securities needed to settle
transactions where those securities are not held in inventory. Nonetheless, while secu-
rities lending may be a useful tool, these markets are currently not suﬃciently liquid
(see Fleming and Garbade (2002) for an analysis of the impact of illiquid security
lending market in the crisis following the September 11 attack). Hence, in this sec-
tion we assume that no securities lending market is in place and analyse the systemic
eﬀects arising from the failure to settle of one or more participants in the SSS.
We simulate settlement, over a trading day T in a system with Na participants. We
assume that S shares (of the same security) are traded in the system and each one is
12
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 404
November 2004exchanged several times among the participants during a trading cycle. We monitor
the buyer and seller (if trade happen) of each share at any time step. We also monitor
if an operational delay occurs during any of the transactions, and if the delay lasts
longer than the remaining time till settlement. In the case of gross settlement each
share is settled independently from the others. If a participant cannot settle the trade
for a given share, all the participants that agreed to exchange that share afterwards
will also not be able to settle their trades. Hence, if the chain of transaction breaks
at one point, all the transaction after the breaking point will result in a default. In
the case of netting, the trades of all shares of the same stock are settled together
by netting the participant positions. The failure of one or more participants to
deliver their net position of shares results in an unwind, i.e., the deletion of all of the
trades involving the defaulting participant and the recalculation of the settlement
obligations of the non-defaulting participants. Because of the cancellation of some
trades when recalculating the net position of the remaining participant is possible
that new traders will ﬁnd themselves unable to settle. This may trigger more failures
and unwinding. The settlement process can be completed ( possibly after a number
of unwinding cycles), when all remaining participants can settle.
We assume in a day there are N intraday batches. The length of each settlement
interval is Tn = T/N. Real time settlement is recovered in the limit of N large.
We assume here that securities are exchanged with a probability λ per time unit. A
high value of λ indicates a very liquid market. The number of trades in an interval
(t1,t 2)i sg i v e nb ymt1,t2. On average ¯ m(t1,t 2)=λ(t2 − t1).
We also assume that, with a probability µ, each transaction could experience a ran-
dom delay τ to settle. We take τ to be uniformly distributed in the interval (0,τ M)
where τM is the maximum delay expected given the speciﬁc market available IT
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the ﬁrst time t∗
γ a trader experiences a delay suﬃcient to generate settlement failure.
If trade experience a delay under gross arrangements, all subsequent trades of the
same share will fail to settle. The size of the settlement failure over a settlement
cycle is given by d =
S
γ=1 mt∗
γ,Tn. The average default ratio rd is calculated dividing
d by the total number of transactions over the same period, and then averaging over
1000 simulations.
The netting algorithm works as follow:
1. We store all the trades of participants in a common settlement system with
each other in a matrix J. The element Ji,j gives the number of stocks trader
i has sold to trader j. The overall number of sales of participant i is given by
si =
N
j=1Ji,j and the overall number of purchases is given by pi = −
N
j=1Jj,i.
2. A default occur at time t if t + τ>T n as in the gross system. We record the
number of trades that participant i fails to settle with participant j in a matrix
Fi,j. The total number of failure of participant i is given by Fi =
N
j=1Fi,j.
3. At the settlement date we calculate the net positions ni of each participants by
computing
ni = si − pi.
If ni is positive trader i has to transfer ni stock to settle. If ni is negative trader
i has to receive ni stocks.
2This implies that default may only happen for trades that occur suﬃciently close to
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si − Fi ≥ ni.
If the above condition is satisﬁed by all participant the settlement process can
be ﬁnalised successfully. All participant for whom this condition is not satisﬁed
fail to settle.
5. We calculate the failure condition in parallel for all participants. If one, or
more, participants cannot settle their net positions they are removed from the
system, all their trades are cancelled, and the positions of all other participants
are recalculated. For example, assume participant k defaults. We ﬁrst set, for
all j, Fj,k = Jk,j (traders will not be able to deliver the shares they have not
received from k) and then we reset Jk,j = Jj,k = 0. We ﬁnally recalculate the
positions of all remaining participants. The steps 3-5 are repeated iteratively
until all participants left in the system can settle (or until all participants have
defaulted).
We study the dependence of the failure rate on the number N of intraday batches.
While reducing the settlement frequency has the advantage of reducing the number
of parties exchanging any given security between two settlement cycles, and hence
systemic risk, it also increases the rate of failures generated by the random delays.
We compare the performance (measured as the ratio of transactions that fail to settle
in a given period over the total number of transactions in the same period) of the
gross and netting system under diﬀerent market conditions, i.e. for diﬀerent values
of λ (which is a proxy for liquidity), µ and τM (which measures the reliability of IT
infrastructures, or extend of human mistakes), the number of shares S of the same
security traded (which represents the trading volume) and the distribution of shares
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among market participant (which is a measure of heterogeneity in the market).III. SIMULATION AND RESULTS
We assume 1 minute to be the shortest time necessary for executing a transaction
and we take it as the unit of time. A typical trading day T lasts for 512 minutes
(about 8.5 hours). The values we considered initially for the various parameters are
µ =0 .01,0.1,1, λ =0 .01,0.1,1, τM = 512,51.2,5.12, Na = 100 and S = 1000.
In ﬁgure 1 we plot the initial default rate, the total default rate and the ratio between
the two for gross systems as a function of N and diﬀerent levels of λ.I n t h i s c a s e
τM =5 1 .2, µ =0 .1, Na = 1000 and S = 100. In this set of simulations τM is chosen
to be one tenth of the length of trading day. When increasing N, Tn becomes smaller
than τM and delays become more likely to last longer than the settlement batch. This
explains the initial rise of the default rate with N (with a peak at Tn ∼ τM). By
increasing N further, the probability that defaults last longer than settlement remains
large. Nonetheless, increasing N has the positive eﬀect of reducing the number of
transactions before settlement (at N = 512 only one transaction can possibly be
executed) and, so doing, reduces systemic eﬀects. In the limit of N large trade
settles in real time and in all the plots the rate of default converges, as expected,
to µ =0 .1. By increasing λ, the number of exchanges in between two settlement
dates increases, and consequently increases the number of participants which may be
aﬀected by a default and systemic eﬀects. This explain the increase of the default
rate rd,w i t hλ, while the initial default rate remains constant (ﬁgure 1a).
In gross systems shares are settled independently from each other, so the total number
does not play a major role (apart for sharpening the statistical behaviour of the
16
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play a crucial role. While an increase in the number of traded shares may have the
eﬀect of reducing the net exposure of each participant, and hence reduce the number
of initial failures to settle, if a failure happens it may generate larger systemic eﬀects
as the number of counterparts aﬀected by the unwinding process may also increases.
We compare diﬀerent initial distributions of shares and assign shares at the beginning
according to the rule:
• we pick up an agent i at random
• we assign the agent a number of stock S(i)=σ S where   ∼ U(0,1).
• we calculate the number of remaining stocks S1.
• if there are stocks left to assign we pick up another agent j at random and assign
the agent a number of stock accordingly to the rule S(j)=m i n ( S1,σ S).
• we continue the procedure until there are stocks left.
By increasing σ we move from an homogeneous situation with shares equally dis-
tributed among many agents to an heterogeneous distribution with shares concen-
trated in the hands of very few agents.
In the netting system, the trade oﬀ between stabilising and destabilising eﬀects when
increasing N is still visible. Figure 2a shows that the volume of transactions is con-
siderably lower under netting arrangements. Furthermore in ﬁgure 2c, we show that
the number of banks initially failing after netting decreases substantially compared
to gross architectures, particularly at low N.
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scenarios for λ, S and σ.
We observe that by increasing the number of stocks the system becomes more stable
in the homogeneous case (ﬁgure 3) and more and more unstable as heterogeneity
increases (ﬁgure 4). Both the homogeneous and heterogeneous cases are always more
stable than the gross system al low N. As heterogeneity increases the net system
becomes more and more unstable than the gross system as N increases because of
systemic eﬀects.
In the following we study systemic eﬀects in more detail, focusing on the homogeneous
case and compare (ﬁgure 5,6) the distribution of defaults in net and gross system for
λ =0 .01, σ =0 .01 and S = 1000. In ﬁgure 6 we plot the default sizes for each of the
1000 simulations of the experiment. The ﬁgure shows that in the net system, when
default events start to appear (at N ≥ 8) they can generate much higher disruption
than in the corresponding gross case even if the average default rate is comparable.
In ﬁgure 6 we plot the cumulative distribution of defaults size for the gross and net
systems for the parameters above and N = 32. The average number of transactions
(and of possible defaults) in this case is 160. The ﬁgure clearly shows that, while the
initial distribution of defaults in netting systems is always below the corresponding
distribution in gross system, the ﬁnal distribution of defaults becomes fatter tailed in
netting systems. This is a clear evidence of systemic eﬀects taking place. Furthermore
the decay of the cumulative distribution function in the netting system seems to be
hyperbolic. 3. This could indicate that the net system goes through a critical phase
3The decay only extends over a decade, given the small value of the maximum default size
for this choice of the parameters.)
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possible one) are possible.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we examined some issues that arise with respect to the performance
of diﬀerent securities settlement architectures under the assumption of exogenous
random delays in settlement. In particular we focused on the eﬀects of the length
of settlement cycles on settlement failure under diﬀerent market conditions involving
factors such as liquidity, trading volume, the frequency and length of delays and
heterogeneity in the initial distribution of shares.
We found that the length of settlement cycles has a non-monotonic eﬀect on failures
under both gross and net architectures and that there is no clear-cut ranking of which
architecture performs better. Thus which architecture will be less prone to settlement
failure depends on a variety of factors which were uncovered by our analysis.
On average, netting systems seem to be more stable (at least in homogeneous condi-
tions) but rare events may lead to contagious defaults that may aﬀect the all system.
Furthermore netting system are very sensitive to the number and the distribution of
traded shares. In homogeneous conditions (i.e. shares initially equally distributed
among participants), as the number of traded stocks increases netting systems are
more stable. Under heterogeneous conditions (i.e. participants have diﬀerent size as
measured by the number of shares they trade) increasing the number of stocks traded
generates a higher rate of defaults.
A possible extension of this research is to endogenize the settlement failure decision
19
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November 2004as a response to movements in securities prices. Although the operator of the SSS
can discourage such strategic default by imposing a ﬁne which taxes away potential
gain from such behaviour, it would still be interesting to study its eﬀects on diﬀerent
SSSs architectures.
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FIG. 1. Initial default rate (left) total default rate (center) and ratio of total defaults
over initial defaults in gross systems as a function of N at various levels of λ:0 . 0 1( b l a c k ,
circles), 0.1 (red, squares), 1 (green, diamonds). In each case τM =5 1 .2, µ =0 .1, Na = 100
and S = 1000.

















































































































































FIG. 2. Ratio between total volume of net transaction and total volume of gross trans-
actions (left) net initial default rate (center) and ratio between initial number of defaults
in net and initial number of defaults in gross systems as a function of N at various levels
of λ: 0.01 (black, circles), 0.1 (red, squares), 1 (green, diamonds). In each case τM =5 1 .2,
µ =0 .1, Na = 100 and S = 1000.
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FIG. 3. Default rate in net systems as a function of N at various levels of λ:0 . 0 1
(black, circles), 0.1 (red, squares), 1 (green, diamonds) at diﬀerent level of S: S = 10 (left),
S = 100 (center), S = 1000 (right). In each case τM =5 1 .2, µ =0 .1, Na = 100.
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FIG. 4. Default rate in netting systems at diﬀerent level of λ, S and σ. λ increases from
top to bottom: λ =0 .01,0.1,1. and σ increases from left to right σ =0 .01,0.1,1. Each plot
shows three curves at diﬀerent level of S = 10 (red, squares), S = 100 (green, diamonds),
S = 1000 (blue, triangles). The black line (circles) correspond the the gross case. In all
cases τM =5 1 .2, µ =0 .1, Na = 100.
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FIG. 5. Default size in gross (left) and net system (right) as a function of N with



























































FIG. 6. Cumulative distribution of initial default size (left) and total default size (right)
in gross (black) and net systems (red) with τM 51.2, λ =0 .01, µ =0 .1, σ =0 .01, Na = 100,
S = 1000 and N = 32. For the gross system (black) the average size of default is 14.145
and for the net system (red) the average size of default is 13.30. The average number of
transaction before settlement is 160.
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